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THE FUTURE OF WALES IN EUROPE 
Rachel Minto* and Kevin Morgan† 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wales’ post-Brexit European strategy is currently under construction, as part of a wider international 
relations strategy, spearheaded by a new Minister for International Relations and the Welsh 
Language, Eluned Morgan. 1  In this contribution, we explore Wales’ existing three-pronged approach 
to engagement in Europe and highlight the ways in which Wales needs to adapt and tailor its 
approach for a post-Brexit context.  We argue that a successful post-Brexit strategy should address 
two key issues.  Firstly, it must deliberately ensure a clear coherence between domestic and external 
agendas.  Secondly, it must actively engage with actors beyond government, providing financial and 
organisational support for this engagement.  Attentive consideration of these issues is imperative in 
the shadow of both severe capacity constraints and the reconfigured legal and political relationship 
between the UK, Wales and the EU post-Brexit. 
 
 
B. THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ACTIVITY OF SUB-STATES: WALES IN EUROPE 
 
The European Union (EU) serves as a valuable political arena for sub-state actors, affording them 
possibilities of policy influence, capacity building, profile raising and partnership formation, outwith 
the structure of the Member State of which they are part. Whilst far from a ‘Europe of the Regions’, 
the raft of Regional offices in Brussels is one indication of the hospitability of the wider European 
political system to the representation of sub-state interests. The UK is no exception, with Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland holding long-established outposts in Brussels, as the physical hub or 
“front door” for their European activity.  This international relations activity of sub-states (known as 
paradiplomacy)2 is predominantly expressed through non-legal tools and mechanisms.  Indeed, as is 
the dominant convention within devolved or federal state structures,3 Wales does not hold legal 
powers over any outward-facing policy area, including the external dimension of devolved policy 
areas; 4 and so promotes its policies and priorities in Europe through less formal methods. 
 
Whatever the nature of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, Europe will remain a crucial site for Wales, 
as part of its wider international activity. Wales’ post-Brexit position in Europe will be determined to 
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a large extent by the future relationship established between the UK and the EU. Unsurprisingly, this 
is the case at present, with the Welsh relationship shaped by the twin phenomena of the UK’s EU 
membership and devolution.5 At the time of writing, consensus around this future UK-EU 
relationship remains elusive; however, the Welsh Government has been consistent in advocating 
close European ties,6 including continued membership of the Customs Union, participation in the 
Single Market, and participation in key EU programmes, particularly Erasmus+, Creative Europe and 
Horizon Europe. 7  
 
If Brexit takes place, it will see Wales become a de facto Region of a non-EU Member State, with 
very restricted opportunities for access and influence in Europe. This leaves Wales particularly 
exposed given the weakness of the UK’s intergovernmental relations structures in affording Welsh 
influence, 8 which is further compounded by Wales’ poor bargaining hand (particularly when 
compared to the other devolved nations). If Wales wants to influence forthcoming EU programmes, 
and gain access to European funding, partnership and investment opportunities, it will require 
deeper and stronger alliances within Europe.9 
 
 
C. HOW MIGHT WALES’ PROFILE CHANGE IN EUROPE POST-BREXIT? 
 
Wales’ activity in Europe revolves around three strands:10 an outpost in Brussels; participation in 
European networks; and bilateral partnerships.  As the UK leaves the EU, Wales must refresh each 
strand to reflect new political and institutional frameworks, revised domestic agendas and significant 
capacity limitations with which Wales must contend post-Brexit.  
 
(1) Wales’ representation in Brussels 
 
As an international office, the key functions of the Welsh Government’s representation abroad are 
intelligence gathering, policy influence, profile raising and partnership building. 11  Welsh 
Government officials also enjoy the benefits of full accreditation as part of the UK’s Permanent 
Representation to the EU. Notwithstanding this formal accreditation, as a Regional representation, 
Welsh Government officials do not have the level of privileged access and inclusion as their British 
counterparts.  As such, Wales’ international office in Brussels already has to work harder to develop 
and maintain relationships in Europe beyond the formal structures available to Member State 
actors.  Brexit will only increase the significance of these relationships. 
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Wales’ presence in Brussels has undergone something of a transformation as the devolution process 
has unfolded. Today, the Welsh Government is co-located with Wales Higher Education Brussels, the 
National Assembly for Wales and, until March 2018, the Welsh Local Government Association. 
Although all based in Wales House, these organisations operate as distinct entities with limited 
formal cooperation between them. This is in stark contrast to the original, pre-devolution model of 
Welsh representation in Brussels – through the Wales European Centre (WEC) – which embodied a 
co-operative, partnership approach to promoting Wales and Welsh interests in Europe.  
 
The WEC first opened its doors in 1992. Its activity supported and was supported by a number of 
sponsoring organisations, including the Welsh Development Agency and Welsh Local Government as 
leading sponsors and, beyond this, Training and Enterprise Councils, Welsh Universities and the 
Wales Council for Voluntary Action, to name but a few. This networked approach fostered a ‘Team 
Wales’ attitude and supported a variety of actors in their engagement with Europe. However, with 
the establishment of the Welsh Assembly Government, this model was displaced. 
 
Notwithstanding its existing channels of access and influence that are independent from the UK’s EU 
membership, post-Brexit, Wales will have to work harder to capitalise on the partnership and 
funding opportunities provided by Europe on the one hand and, on the other, to influence projects, 
programmes and policies which continue to take effect in Wales. This will necessitate the forging 
and maintenance of stronger formal and informal alliances, guided by clear objectives, and the role 
of Wales’ office in Brussels will be key in this alliance-building process.  
 
In the shadow of post-Brexit capacity constraints, Wales’ representation in Brussels ought to fully 
engage with actors beyond government so as to represent, support and be supported by a broad 
base of Welsh organisations. This broader-based partnership model is not to detract from the key 
role for Government, but instead goes hand in hand with it.  
 
 
(2) European networks 
 
Networks – both formal and informal – are an integral part of the European political landscape.  
They serve as structures for information exchange, policy development, advocacy activity and 
collaborative working; 12 and, unsurprisingly, participation in European networks is an important 
pillar of Wales’ European activity.  Post-Brexit, the significance of these networks as “gateways to 
Europe” will increase. 
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As it stands, the Welsh Government participates in a range of pan-European networks. Some are 
extensive in reach and focus, such as the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR), 
which even embraces North Africa and works across a range of policy areas. Others, are smaller and 
more focused, such as the Vanguard Initiative for innovation and smart specialisation in industry, 
which Wales has recently joined; and the Four Motors for Europe, which aims to promote the 
knowledge economy at the regional level, in which Wales is an Associate Member. 
 
Once again, this dimension of European activity is not reserved for the Government. Instead, 
organisations across the piece use European networks to support their domestic activity. For 
example, the National Assembly for Wales participates in the Conference of European Regional 
Legislative Assemblies (CALRE), the WLGA is a member of the Council of European Municipalities and 
Regions (CEMR) and Cardiff is a member of EUROCITIES. Then there are numerous Welsh civil society 
organisations (such as Women’s Equality Network Wales through the European Women’s Lobby) 
and trade unions (such as the National Farmers’ Union Cymru through COPA-COGECA, the 
Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations - General Committee for Agricultural 
Cooperation in the European Union), all of which are networked into Europe. 13 
 
Participation in European networks generates multiple dividends, enabling Welsh players from 
across the board to access and exchange information, to seek policy influence, to build and maintain 
strategic partnerships and to secure investment.  Although Brexit may see the UK and Wales lose 
their privileged status as full members of some of these networks, there have been some clear 
indications that European Regions and organisations would like to maintain their relationship with 
their UK-based counterparts.14  But given the financial commitment required, participation must 
necessarily be selective, with decisions to invest (and perhaps disinvest) in these European networks 
carefully aligned with domestic priorities which may themselves shift with Brexit. 
 
 
(3) Bilateral relationships 
 
The Welsh Government cultivates formal and informal relationships with Regions across Europe; 
with this activity being an important part of the work undertaken from the Brussels Office.  The 
longest standing of these more formal relationships is with Brittany, through a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed in 2004 and then refreshed in 2018.  As Brexit restricts Wales’ access and 
influence in Europe, these bilateral relationships will become ever more important, furnishing Wales 
with concrete opportunities for collaboration and exchange. Indeed, since the EU Referendum, 
Wales has placed more emphasis upon these relationships, as a complement to its networking 
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activity. It is forging a series of bilateral alliances with regions with which it feels a sense of strong 
common identity and mutual interest. Beyond Brittany, these bilateral alliances include the Basque 
Country, Galicia, Nord Holland and Flanders among others.  
 
Notwithstanding the symbolic value of these relationships (which has some significance in and of 
itself), any strategic alliance must align with domestic priorities and, in turn, involve Welsh actors 
beyond Government. Looking at the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Brittany on 11 
January 2018, it committed the two parties to cooperate in the following ways:15 to strengthen 
economic cooperation, including identifying opportunities for business-to-business exchanges; to 
develop cooperation in the field of education and training (within the bounds of competence), 
including youth exchanges; to create relationships for exchange between cultural networks; to share 
and promote best practice regarding language planning; and to develop exchanges of experiences 
and information in all fields of mutual interest, including cybersecurity, sustainable development, 
renewable energy, tourism (particularly water sports and sailing activities), and the development of 
trade in the agrifood area. 
 
Although this appears a sound framework for cooperation – speaking as it does to some of Wales’ 
economic, social and cultural priorities – it is only meaningful insofar as tangible benefits are derived 
from it.  This will necessitate the design and implementation of various programmes of work, 
implicating a wide pool of diverse actors. If this is a template for the other bilateral alliances, it raises 
the question as to whether the Welsh Government has the institutional capacity (specifically, the 
officer expertise and financial resources) to deliver across a range of bilateral alliances. This throws 
the prioritisation of bilateral relationships into sharp focus. 
 
 
D. THE WAY AHEAD 
 
The re-imagination of Wales’ future in Europe – as a Region of a non-EU Member State – must be 
carefully aligned with the three strands of existing activity: Wales’ representation in Brussels; 
membership of European networks; and bilateral relationships.  In the context of severe capacity 
constraints, it is imperative that the Welsh Government remains acutely attentive to the coherence 
between its internal and external agendas, and embraces a stronger co-production ethos to work 
more closely with its partners in business, universities, civil society organizations and beyond. This 
collaborative, network-based approach will deliver a double dividend: it will help Wales to draw on 
all its national resources and it will send a compelling signal that international engagement is a 
matter for the whole nation and not just its government. 
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